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Conditional Parentage is the New Eugenics
Dr. Yael Efron & Dr. Pnina Lifshitz-Aviram
I. INTRODUCTION
Should states allow people to condition their parentage upon
the traits of their prospective child? Is it legitimate for parents to
aspire to an improved offspring, or should eugenic practices be
restrained? Despite its reputation and the negative moral value
attributed to eugenics,1 we argue in this paper that parental selection
practices are growing in scope and abundance2 and are eugenics de
facto. We further claim that, in considering this reality, the practices
of genetic selection should be evaluated just as other forms of
parental and reproductive autonomy are discussed: based on their
reasons and justifications, rather than on terminology.
We examine the growing practice of eugenics as a fastdeveloping aspect of a legal phenomenon we call ‘conditional
parentage’. 3 We use this term to describe the choice given to, or
desired by, prospective parents to decide whether they wish to
parent a specific child or fetus. In this paper we claim that, unlike
eugenics, conditional parentage is well-accepted in modern
societies, as well as in several legal systems, such as France,
England, and Israel. We wish to contribute to the existing literature
on parental selection a new conceptualization for eugenics. We
claim that when considered as a form of conditional parentage,
eugenics has gained popularity in the obstetrics field and serve
justifiable ends. We urge policymakers to embrace this new concept


Dr. Pnina Lifshitz-Aviram is a Lecturer of Law and Bio-Ethics, Zefat
Academic College; author of the books INFORMED CONSENT OF MINORS (2006)
(Heb.) and DELICATE BALANCE (2016) (Heb.). Dr. Yael Efron is Vice Dean of
Zefat College School of Law, an expert in legal education and alternative
dispute resolution and teaches Family Law.
1
Stephen Wilkinson, Eugenics, Embryo Selection and the Equal Value Principle
1 CLINICAL ETHICS 46, 50 (2006).
2
Rosamund Scott, Choosing Between Possible Lives: Law and Ethics of
Prenatal and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 1 (2007).
3
The term conditional parentage differs from the psychologic term ‘conditional
parenting’, as explained hereafter.
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when considering whether and how to restrict the parental choice of
parentage, rather than reject it altogether based on a dated concept
of eugenics. We call on them to acknowledge and regulate
conditional parentage.
To demonstrate our claim, we compare three practices of
parental selection, which we consider falling under the umbrella of
‘conditional parentage’. All three are examples of states’ policies for
approval, endorsement, and even encouragement for prospective
parents to condition their parentage upon the traits of a specific child
or fetus. We show this in adoption, abortion and preimplantation
genetic diagnosis (PGD). We focus on three jurisdictions that share
a common history of resentment towards eugenics: England, where
the term was first introduced; Europe, where less than a century ago,
horrific acts were performed under a misconceived notion of
eugenics; and Israel, whose inhabitants are still haunted by Nazi
eugenic practices.
The term “eugenics,” coined by Sir Francis Galton,4 combines
two Greek words: GEN (source or root) and EUS (good or fitting).
Thus, suggesting the improvement of offspring. Galton was devoted
to propagating the idea of improving the physical and mental
makeup of the human species via selective parenthood.5 The term
eugenics refers to both positive and negative eugenics. 6 Positive
eugenics encourage the birth of newborns with what are considered
positive character traits with the aim to “promote” successful
populations.7 Negative eugenics aims at preventing the increase of
problematic populations, inter alia, by minimizing procreation of
people considered to have negative characteristics, and in extreme
cases by killing the sick and disabled. It was based on these theories,
that horrific interventions in human reproduction were carried out
throughout history, some of which will be reviewed hereafter.

4

Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development 24 (1883).
Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Sir Francis Galton, Encyclopedia
Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Francis-Galton (last visited
July 12, 2019).
6
Some distinguish therapeutic goods of genetic engineering, aimed at curing
diseases (what we refer to as negative eugenics) from eugenic goods of genetic
engineering, aimed at enhancing capabilities (what we refer to as positive
eugenics). See Nicholas Agar, Liberal Eugenics, 12(2) PUBLIC AFFAIRS
QUARTERLY 137, 141 (1998).
7
An experiment designed to fertilize upper-class women with sperm from Nobel
prize winners ended with disappointing results and is described in DAVID PLOTZ,
THE GENIUS FACTORY: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF THE NOBEL PRIZE SPERM
BANK (2005).
5
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Having established the prominence of parental selection
practices, this paper admits that even states that allow for various
forms of eugenics, although not named as such, make a strong
argument for regulating them. The use of eugenics as conditional
parentage could be justified both on a personal-interest level, as well
as on a state-interest level. State regulation, however, has two facets.
On the one hand, it is necessary to prevent the dangerous use of such
medical and social practices. On the other, state intervention in
reproduction had been the root of historical abuse of science, and
should therefore be limited. The contribution of this paper to
existing literature is the comparison between the interests that
governed eugenic in the past to those that inform regulation today.
Today, paternalistic regulation binds parent’s autonomous choice to
opt for selection. Whereas past regulation was coercive and
paternalistic in its attempt to force eugenic practices on prospective
parents. In this regard, we oppose the notion that the distinguishing
mark of the new liberal eugenics is state neutrality.8
The shift in state concerns requires a new perception of
eugenics. Respecting parents’ autonomy calls for a different
perspective on the regulation of eugenic practices. In this paper, we
call for the acknowledgement of modern eugenics as a form of
conditional parentage, and that it should, therefore, be regulated in
a cautious manner, rather than banned altogether. We suggest that
current regulation of such practices, previously considered
paternalistic, are in fact a recognition of parents’ autonomy to
choose their prospective offspring. In this paper, we offer
suggestions for regulatory guidelines that might be adopted.
In the next section of this paper, we describe eugenics as a
socio-medical phenomenon, evolving over time and yielding to
regulatory frameworks. We then introduce conditional parentage as
a legal phenomenon, demonstrated by several practices of selective
parentage. In the last chapter we provide suggested guidelines for
regulating eugenics in attempt to balance respect of parental choice
with other paternalistic considerations.
II. EUGENICS AS A SOCIO-MEDICAL
PHENOMENON
In this section, we define and describe eugenics, and discuss its
socio-medical development. We also recognize the need for
8

Agar, Supra note 6, at 137.
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regulating eugenics and detail some forms of its regulation.
Eugenics are described as “the science of improving human stock.”9
The medical definition has long evolved into a philosophy, which is
widely condemned today. The philosophy justifies the prevention of
procreation of certain populations. We argue that the horrific turn of
events skewed the legitimate aim of eugenics, which is to minimize
pain and hardships to individuals and communities. We argue that
justifiable aims, regulated and monitored, do not necessarily lead to
evil deeds. We do, however, recognize that scientific developments
may be the catalyst for amendments in eugenic regulation.
A. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF EUGENICS
The concept of improving a population by controlled breeding,
in order to increase the occurrence of socially desirable
characteristics thought to be hereditary originated from Francis
Galton’s idea on marriage. Galton believed a system of arranged
marriages between men of distinction and women of wealth that
would eventually produce a gifted race.10 Galton’s ideas of positive
selection were embraced by a eugenics movement, founded in 1904.
At the heart of the eugenics movement lay certain social and
scientific assumptions. One such assumption was that certain
characteristics and traits were thought to be hereditary. The
characteristics viewed as almost exclusively hereditary were mental
retardation, mental illness, criminality, prostitution, sexual
perversion and other types of immoral behavior. 11 These
assumptions led the movement to advocate for negative eugenics
(discouraging and decreasing procreation by individuals and groups
who were viewed as having inferior or undesirable traits), even more
than for positive eugenics (encouragement of procreation by
individuals and groups who were viewed as possessing desirable
characteristics and genes).12

9

Id.
Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius (1869).
11
Science today renounces this notion, of course. Investigators who thought to
trace the gene for idleness or criminality that they found in the same family for
generations concluded that such traits result from complex interactions of genes
and environment. Kim Sterelny & Philip Kitcher, The Return of the Gene, 85(7)
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 339 (1988).
12
An example for such regulatory initiative, outside the scope of our studied
jurisdictions, can be found in the LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA
(1979).
10
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The movement was also concerned that families with
“defective” offspring were a financial burden on the state and
estimated that the “civilized world” spends about five billion dollars
caring for mental defectives in public institutions.13 However, the
economic argument was secondary to the primary concern of
preventing the social delinquency and crime which was attributed to
mental retardation and other assumed inherited conditions. Henry
Goddard, a leading specialist in delinquency in the United States at
the beginning of the 20th century, emphasized the correlation
between mental retardation and crime. He coined the term “moron”
and viewed the mentally weak as a menace to society and
civilization and as playing a large role for most social problems.14
Under these eugenic ‘scientific’ assumptions, horrific deeds
were performed worldwide under the auspices of the law. It was
based on eugenics that the Nazi concept of “a pure race” emerged
too. In 1933, shortly after Hitler’s rise to power, legislation was
passed that made it compulsory to undergo sterilization and
termination of pregnancy based on eugenics. 15 Sterilization was
forced upon people with mental illness, learning disabilities,
physical deformities, epilepsy, blindness, deafness and alcoholism.
Initiated by Heinrich Himmler, the Nazi state forced motherhood on
Aryan women under the eugenics plan known as Lebensborn.
According to this plan, women of upper-class status were
imprisoned in a mating farm and forced to copulate with SS officers
to
produce
a
special
“titanic” generation.16
The Nazi abuse of eugenics brought about harsh criticism and
these “scientific” assumptions were finally discredited. Sterilization
laws influenced by this distorted theory, were enacted in many states
outside of Europe and held firm for many decades to follow. In fact,
instances of involuntary sterilization under the auspices of the law
continued worldwide well into the 1970’s. For example, by 1965,
about one-third of all Puerto Rican women of child-bearing age

13

Ezra Seymour Gosney & Paul Popenoe, Sterilization for Human Betterment
viii (1929).
14
HENRY GODDARD, FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS NATURE AND
CONSEQUENCES (1914).
15
Gisela Bock, Racism and Sexism in Nazi Germany: Motherhood, Compulsory
Sterilization, and the State, When Biology became Destiny: Women in Weimar
and Nazi Germany 400, 407 (1984).
16
PATRIZIA ALBANESE, MOTHERS OF THE NATION: WOMEN, FAMILIES AND
NATIONALISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE 37 (2006).
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underwent sterilization under the local legal regime. 17 Between
1975 and 1977, India had approximately seven million people
sterilized in a nineteen-month period, under a governmental
sterilization program led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. 18 Even
in Canada, the Sexual Sterilization Act, allowing involuntary
sterilization under certain conditions, was only repealed in 1972.19
B. REGULATION OF EUGENICS
Whether socially and legally accepted, or criticized and
condemned, practices of eugenics have always been regulated.
When regulating the different forms of eugenics, three sets of
concerns could be regarded. The first and most prominent concern
in the historic eugenic movement was the concern for the
community. The desire for a homogenic group, the fear of unsettling
a balance that would inflict discomfort to the dominant group and
the concern for the economic burden entailed in resorting this
balance were the drivers for the legal framework regulating
eugenics. 20 The second set of concerns involves the prospective
parents. These include their desire for autonomous decision-making
about their lives, their emotional well-being and their financial
burden. The last set of concerns has to do with the unborn child.
These concerns involve the medical, religious, legal and ethical
viewpoint regarding the “life” of a fetus. But, since the last set of
concerns goes beyond the scope of this argument, we wish to focus
on concerns of the future care and well-being of the offspring once
it is born.
The concern for the community had been the main driver of the
eugenic movement in the past. 21 Sterilization of the mentally or
A law regulating “eugenic sterilization” was enacted in Puerto Rico (Act
number 116 of May 13, 1937) and was not repealed until June 8, 1960. See
Bonnie Mass, Puerto Rico: A Case Study of Population Control, 4(4) LAT. AM.
PERSPECT. 66 (1977).
18
IAN ROBERT DOWBIGGIN, THE STERILIZATION MOVEMENT AND GLOBAL
FERTILITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 121-122 (2008).
19
Sexual Sterilization Repeal Act c. 87 (1972).
20
Describes how politicians and scientists portrayed society as an organic body
that had to be guided by biological laws: “Eugenics promoted a biologizing
vision of society in which the reproductive rights of individuals were
subordinated to the rights of an abstract organic collectivity” Frank Dikötter,
Race culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics, 103(2) AM. HIST.
REV. 467, 468 (1998).
21
Daniel Wikler, Can We Learn From Eugenics? 25 J. MED. ETHICS 183, 193
(1999).
17
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physically impaired was considered to be akin to vaccination.
Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court explained this
rationale in 1927:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could
not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in
order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better
for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.22
The laws that regulated eugenics, in many places in the world,
followed the same reasoning. It was considered a public good to
have a homogenic society, and the law was a justifiable means of
creating one. As Holmes concluded, “The law does all that is needed
when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within
the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so
far and so fast as its means allow.”23
What differentiates past regulation of eugenic practices from
what we suggest in this paper is the fact that historic regulation was
government-led and coercive. 24 The societal good is not an
illegitimate goal, rather the general consensus in liberal societies
today, as in many of their legal systems, is that the well-being of the
group cannot champion individual rights without proper
consideration. The question of moral importance is whether it can
be done fairly and justly. As Wikler puts it: “[i]t wasn’t, the last time
it was tried.”25
One possible model for a state to promote communal
considerations in a non-coercive way is by generously funding
prenatal examinations to detect genetic disorders. 26 In Israel, for
22

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
Id. at 208.
24
Jonathan Glover Et. Al., Eugenics: Some Lessons from the Nazi Experience
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION: ETHICS, CHOICE AND REGULATION 55
(1998).
25
Wikler, Supra note 21 at 193.
26
E.g., Avishalom Westreich ET. AL. Brill Research Perspectives in Family Law
in a Global Society Assisted Reproduction in Israel: Law, Religion and Culture,
1 2 (2018); Yehezkel Margalit, Determining Legal Parentage: Between Family
Law and Contract Law - On Challenges Determination of Legal Parenthood in
the Modern Era, 6 HAIFA L. REV. 553 (2012).
23
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instance, there are no state-required procedures to ensure the birth
of a healthy baby, but an extraordinary state budget is allocated to
prenatal screening tests. As a result, most Israeli parents opt for these
examinations. If a genetic defect is recognized, it is entirely up to
the parents to decide how to act; there is no state intervention in the
decision. However, societal pressure, created by the scarcity of
impairment in the public sphere, leads many parents to terminate
pregnancies of genetically impaired offspring. 27
The concern for the prospective parents is the second set of
concerns we wish to address when considering regulating eugenics.
Under these, we can find parental autonomy, which will be further
discussed hereafter; emotional concerns; and the financial burden
involved in raising a child with special needs. In the past, it was
these concerns that allowed state paternalism to justify negative
eugenics. Today, courts and legislators are weighing parents’ rights
and wishes against other interests. 28 We argue that parentalinterests have replaced the past community-interest driven eugenics.
It is not the state that coerces parents to eliminate unwanted embryos
or to avoid disabled offspring, rather it is the choice of many to
parent a child with what they perceive to be the best genetic profile.
Although not coerced anymore, such choice is endorsed by many
states, by what King calls “laissez-faire eugenics.”29
We turn now to the last set of concerns – that of the prospective
offspring. We wish to distinguish this discussion on the well-being
of the prospective child from the question of whether a fetus holds
any rights or privileges before it is born. For the purpose of our
argument, we wish to concede that for whatever reason the child was
born, its conception was subject to eugenics. What we are interested
in exploring, in this regard, is whether the prospective child’s wellbeing was considered when the eugenic practice took place.

Edem E. Ekwo, Jae‐On Kim, Carol A. Gosselink, John M. Opitz, James F.
Reynolds, Parental Perceptions of the Burden of Genetic Disease, 28(4) AM. J.
MED. GENET. 955 (1987).
28
See, e.g, Lifchez v. Hartigan, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that if the
right to privacy includes the right to avoid reproduction, it should also include
“the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than
prevent, pregnancy”); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678
(1992) (concurring many previous rulings that “the right of privacy includes the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters that so fundamentally affect a person as
does the decision whether to bear or beget a child”).
29
David S. King, “Preimplantation Genetic diagnosis and the ‘New’ Eugenic”
25 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 176 (1999).
27
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When considering eugenic practices, courts and legislators
examine the effect of the decision to birth the offspring on the
quality of life the child would have. The debate over sibling savior
selection, which will be discussed hereafter, is an example of such
deliberation. Should parents have the right to choose an embryo that
would carry specific genetic traits for the purpose of using these
traits as a means for treating another child? Different legal systems
would decide the dilemma differently, but nowadays, all would
consider that prospective child’s well-being.
To conclude this section, we wish to emphasize the difference
between the role of eugenics in the first half of the twentieth century
from what it is today. In the past, eugenic practices were utilized to
“better society” and abused science to justify paternalistic rules that
had overridden parental autonomy while ignoring considerations for
the well-being of the prospective child. Today, eugenic practices
make use of science to fulfil parental wishes and to improve the
quality of life of their offspring. Current eugenics serve as a means
for conditioning parentage, in the service of parents and their
offspring as well as in the service of society as a whole.
III. CONDITIONAL PARENTAGE AS A LEGAL
PHENOMENON
The term ‘conditional parentage’ refers to the choice given to,
or desired by, prospective parents to decide whether they wish to
parent a specific child or fetus. It is distinct from the term
‘conditional parenting’ used in the realm of family psychology. The
psychologist Carl Rogers was the first to argue that parents should
love their children unconditionally, for who they are and not for
what they do.30 Therapists have argued that conditional parenting
can harm the child’s sense of self-worth and social development.31
Despite the obvious linkage of the two terms, this paper does not
deal with the psychological ramifications of loving children with or
without conditions. We focus our argument on the legal frameworks
that allow prospective parents’ preempted decision to become the

30

CARL ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY: ITS CURRENT PRACTICE,
IMPLICATIONS AND THEORY (1953).
31
ALFIE KOHN, UNCONDITIONAL PARENTING: MOVING FROM REWARDS AND
PUNISHMENTS TO LOVE AND REASON (2005).
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parents of a specific child or fetus, and not on how they choose to
raise and educate them if they do become their parents.32
Many legal systems deem the right to parent a fundamental
human right, thus protecting it against state intervention 33 or the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, the
protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.34 The scope and limitations of these types of
interventions are beyond the aim of this paper. We wish to focus on
the legal questions that arise when discussing the symmetric right
not to parent35 and the right (if this desire is indeed protected as
such) to parent a child with or without specific traits.
The narrow point of view of the positive right to be a parent,
which suggests that the right to parent includes the right to choose
offspring of certain characteristics, is morally debated. The moral
32

A similar differentiation is developed in STEPHEN WILKINSON, CHOOSING
TOMORROW’S CHILDREN: THE ETHICS OF SELECTIVE REPRODUCTION (2010),
chapter 2. Wilkinson argues that even if parents should love whatever attributes
their child would have, it does not follow that it is wrong to select a child with
specific attributes. Moreover, parents could aim at having a certain type of child
and still love whichever child they have.
33
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); In P. & S. v. Poland, 2012 Eur. Ct.
H.R., the Court reiterated that the notion of private life within the meaning of
Article 8 applies both to decisions to become and not to become a parent.
34
Article 8 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In App. 16899/13
Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia (29/3/2106) the European Court of Human
Rights held that despite the legitimacy of the aims of the state laws under Article
8 (2) of the Convention, the reasons had been insufficient to justify the
interference with family life, which had been disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued.
35
An argument from symmetry suggests that human rights are equally protected
both in their ‘positive’ form (the right to do or to obtain something) and their
‘negative’ form (the right to refrain from doing or obtaining something). In the
context of this paper, the right to parent is a ‘positive’ right and the right not to
parent is a ‘negative’ right. Barak-Erez & Shapira argue that merely presenting
the positive right as symmetric to the negative right does not entail any
normative conclusion and may result in maneuvering by other moral arguments.
They demonstrate this point by discussing the seemingly symmetric rights to
parent and not to parent. Daphne Barak-Erez & Ron Shapira, The Delusion of
Symmetric Rights, 19 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 297 (1999). Such substitution
of moral arguments with legal arguments was discussed in European Court of
Human Rights Chamber judgment Mizzi v. Malta (12.01.06). There, a Maltese
court denied a request to repudiate a man’s paternity of a child that was born to
his wife, despite DNA evidence. The ECHR held that there had been a violation
of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention of
Human Rights, considering that a fair balance had not been struck between the
general interest of the protection of legal certainty of family relationships and
the applicant’s right to have the legal presumption of his paternity reviewed in
the light of the biological evidence.
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discomfort is clear when parents wish to choose a child with blonde
hair and blue eyes. Screening for a physical trait is less controversial
when both parents are carriers of Cystic Fibrosis and wish to
diagnostically screen for embryos who lack their defective gene.
Both blonde hair and the Cystic Fibrosis gene are physical traits that
can be biologically traced and controlled. Morally, these parental
choices may be viewed differently, but is there a difference when
considering them legally?
The desire for a healthy, intelligent offspring, preferably with
physical resemblance, is understandable and usually expected by
many adults, 36 but is also encouraged by many states. 37 Legal
systems allow for medical practices that ensure that prospective
parents fulfill their wishes for desired parenthood and avoids the
difficulties of raising a child with mental or physical disabilities.
States provide legal instruments that enable this negative aspect of
the parentage right. These legal instruments include the prerogative
of prospective parents to choose their child by process of adoption;
selective abortion, both negative (choosing not to parent impaired
embryos) and positive (choosing a specific desired trait); and
prenatal and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), both
negative (as in screening out undesired embryos) and positive
(choosing embryos with specific traits for implantation).
A. ADOPTION
The legal manifestation of ‘conditional parentage’ could easily
be demonstrated in adoption laws. Adoption is defined in the New
York Consolidated Laws and Domestic Relations Law as a legal
process by which “a person takes another person into the relation of
child and thereby acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities
of parent in respect of such other person.” 38 While in some
jurisdictions authorities may choose the prospective adopters, 39 in
all jurisdictions allow prospective adopters opt into this process with
36

Barak-Erez & Shapira, Id. at 302, deem this to be an existential choice, yet
admit that for others, not becoming a parent may be an existential choice as
well.
37
Yehezkel Margalit, Scarce Medical Resources – Parenthood at Every Age, In
Every Case, and Subsided by the State? 9 Netanya Academic College Law
Review 191 (2014) (Heb.).
38
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 110 (2010). Interestingly, in all three jurisdictions
studied in this paper there is no explicit definition of adoption in the legislature.
39
Such is the case in England and Wales under Section 21(1) of Adoption and
Children Act, 2002.
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no coercion, and exercising full autonomy. 40 This autonomy is
granted to them under the right to parent. We argue that the adoption
processes are a form of conditional parenting, both in the negative
aspect and in the positive aspect.
Most children are born to parents who did not retain any
medical or administrative intervention or assistance in conception or
pregnancy.41 The traits of these offspring are not chosen in advance
and indeed, some are born to their parents’ dismay, with undesired
traits. Some of these children, as well as those born to mothers and
fathers that are unable to attend to their needs, are put up by the state
for adoption. Under legal systems in which adopting parents can
choose the adopted child, these parents may exercise their right not
to parent.
In this section, we argue that when refusal to adopt a specific
child does not revoke the eligibility to adopt a different child,
conditional parentage is practiced. We do acknowledge that perhaps
some jurisdictions may bar prospective adopters from enrolling in
the system if they restrict the choice of adopted children. However,
in the three jurisdictions that we compare this is not the case. In
England, France, and Israel adoption laws do not specify such
sanction. Research also supports our claim that prospective adopters
do in fact base their decision to adopt on characteristics of the
prospective adoptee.42 Furthermore, the adoption policies in many
40

In France an explicit request by adopters must be made to the Tribunal de
Grande to grant an adoption order. See Art. 353 of the French Civil Code. Such
is the requirement in Israel as well. See Sec. 1(a) to the Children Adoption Law,
1981.
41
In 2015, artificial reproductive technology contributed to only 1.7% of all
infants born in the United States. See Saswati Sunderam, Dmitry M. Kissin, Sara
B. Crawford, Suzanne G. Folger, Sheree L. Boulet, Lee Warner and Wanda D.
Barfield, Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance – United States, 2015,
67(No. SS-3) MMWR SURVEILL. SUMM. 1 (2018). Available
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.ss6703a1. By comparison, in France, one
in 35 births (2.9%) in 2012 was a result of assisted reproductive technology. See
AGANCE DE LA BIOMEDICINE, ACTIVITÉ D’ASSISTANCE MÉDICALE À LA
PROCRÉATION 2012 (2013), available at: https://www.agencebiomedecine.fr/annexes/bilan2013/donnees/procreation/01-amp/pdf/amp.pdf/.
42
Matthew D. Bramlett & Laura F. Radel, Factors Associated with Adoption and
Adoption Intentions of Nonparental Caregivers 19(1) ADOPTION QUARTERLY
(2016); Sarah Carnochan, Megan Moore & Michael J Austin, Achieving Timely
Adoption, 10(3) J EVID BASED SOC WORK 210 (2013); Jessica Snowden, Scott
Leon & Jeffrey Sieracki, Predictors of children in foster care being adopted: A
classification tree analysis, 30(11) CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES REVIEW
1318 (2008); Tom McDonald, Alan Press, Peggy Billings & Terry Moore,
Partitioning the adoption process to better predict permanency, 86(3) CHILD
WELFARE 5 (2007); Christian Connell, Karol H. Katz, Leon Saunders & Jacob
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jurisdictions are based on the growing need for permanent
placement of children in need and active encouragement and support
of prospective adopters,43 thus, it seems unlikely to ban interested
adopters from adopting because of their preferences.
In England, the adoption process is governed by the Adoption
and Children Act, 2002. Under this law, state-recognized services
are entailed with the task of matching approved adopters with
children waiting for a family.44 In a guide provided for prospective
adopters, the matching process is described: “If there is a potential
match… your details would be sent to the child’s social worker and
the child’s social worker would send the child’s details to your
social worker for you to think about: [emphasis added].45 We read
this statement as an invitation to practice conditional parentage since
prospective parents are encouraged to choose their adopted child
and allowed to refrain from choosing a child they do not desire. This
popular website, although not of any legal merit, is indicative of
adoption policies in England.46
The Adoption and Children Act itself does not prescribe such
a process in the detail provided in the guide. However, when
detailing conditions for making adoption orders 47 and the
restrictions on making adoption orders,48 the Act is silent regarding
the question of whether the match was the first to be made, or
whether adopters refused the previous matching. The legislature
does state that in determining the suitability of a couple to adopt a
child, proper regard should be given to the need for stability and
permanence in their relationship. 49 Since no case law linked this
section with refusal to adopt a specific child, interpretation could go
both ways. One might suggest that ‘picky-choosy’ parents are not as
stable as demanded, while others might see their final choice as a
sign of a permanent decision. Either way, if no English court had
ever revoked eligibility of adopters based on the fact that they chose
K. Tebes, Leaving foster care – The influence of child and case characteristics
on exit rates, 28(7) CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES REVIEW 780 (2006).
43
Clair Fenton-Glynn, Adoption without consent, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
HEALTH, “ADOPTION: A NEW APPROACH” (DECEMBER 2000).
44
Adoption and Children Act, 2002, Section 2.
45
First4adoption, First Steps, http://www.first4adoption.org.uk/first-stepscomplete/, (First4Adoption is the national information service for people
interested in adopting a child in England).
46
Fenton-Glynn, supra note 43.
47
Adoption and Children Act, supra note 44, § 47.
48
Id. § 48.
49
Id. § 45(2).
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their adopted child, it is fair to conclude that adoption laws in
England enable a practice of conditional parentage.
When comparing the English law with the legal framework in
the United States, similar conclusions may be drawn. Although in
the United States there is limited federal constitutional and statutory
law since adoption is controlled by state law,50 general features of
adoption law that are common across most states. 51 Similarly to
English law, both the general provisions of the United States federal
law and the more specific regulation by the states, no restriction on
the parents to actively choose their adopted child could not be found.
We also found no restrictions to parental freedom of choice in
Israeli, nor in French adoption legislation or case law.
Moreover, several states have recently enacted statutes that
recognize and allow enforcement of “open adoption” or postadoption contact agreements between birth and adoptive families,
and some states even recognize “non-binding open adoption”
agreements.52 By recognizing the autonomy of parents to transfer
and receive parental privileges and responsibilities through
contracts, the states acknowledge the autonomy of prospective
adopters to choose to adopt a specific child. In our view, this is a
legal recognition of the practice of conditional parentage.

50

Several uniform adoption acts have been proposed for the states, but only a
few states have adopted them: NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE
LAWS, UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1969), http://www.uniform
laws.org/shared/docs/adoption/adoption69.pdf; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/adoption/uaa_final_94.pdf.
The 1969 Act has been adopted in Arkansas, Iowa, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma: Legislative Fact Sheet – Adoption Act (1953) (1969), UNIF. LAW
COMM’N,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Adoption%20Act%20%
281953%29%281969%29 (last visited May 11, 2018).
The 1994 Act has been adopted in Vermont: Legislative Fact Sheet – Adoption
Act (1994), UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Adoption%20
Act%20%281994%29
(last visited May 11, 2018).
51
Luis Acosta, Adoption Law: United States, Library of Congress,
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/adoption-law/unitedstates.php#f2 (last visited
May 11, 2018).
52
Id. at n. 24 (A listing and discussion of these statutes can be found in Joan
Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law and Practice (2012) in sections 13-B.01 to 13B.03. See also Yehezkel Margalit, Towards Determining Legal Parentage by
Agreement in Israel, 42 HEB. U. L. REV. (MISHPATIM) 835, 856-57
(2012)(Heb.)).
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Not only modern legal systems are not the only systems to
recognize adoptive parents’ choice of a child. Another form of
conditional parentage can be found in the Jewish law. The Jewish
status of mamzer (bastard), is among other reasons given to a child
conceived as a result of incest. This status prevents the marriage of
a mamzer with any other Jew that is not a mamzer as well. The status
of mamzer cannot ever be erased. This status, however, does not
apply to non-Jews resulting in some Jewish adoptive-parents prefer
the adoption of non-Jewish children53 in order to avoid the fear of
creating unintentional incest in the future for their adopted child.54
This form of selective adoption could also be considered selective
parentage.
B. ABORTION
The pro-life/pro-choice debate is beyond the scope of this
paper, since abortion is legal in all three jurisdictions compared.55
For our purpose, we claim that in legal systems where abortion is
legitimate, even if only under specific circumstances, it is a form of
conditional parentage. The law on selective abortion in the UK is
one example.56 Under the UK Act, if there is “a substantial risk that
if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped,” the parents may
terminate the pregnancy and not parent the unborn child.57 The same
condition is also required under Israeli law.58 Comparatively, under
the French Code, the pregnant woman is free to terminate her
pregnancy before its twelfth week based solely on her reluctance to
continue it.59 This arrangement allows for an even wider scope of
53

This preference is not allowed under the Israeli Adoption Law 1981, Article 5,
determining the religion of adoptive parents to be that of the adopted child. Such
provision does not exist in other legal systems, such as the UK or the US.
54
However, this preference contradicts a different important principle in Jewish
law, which is the preservation of Jewish bloodline. For the debate on this issue
in Jewish Law, see YEHEZKEL MARGALIT, THE JEWISH FAMILY: BETWEEN
FAMILY LAW AND CONTRACT LAW (2017), p.165 and the citations in footnote
127.
55
In England and Wales abortion is regulated in the Abortion Act 1967; in
France it is regulated in the Public Health Code, 1975, last amended in 2016:
Code de la Santé Publique, 1975 : articles L2212-1 à L2212-11; and in Israel it
is regulated in the Penal Code 1977, Articles 312-321.
56
Abortion Act 1967 (UK).
57
Id. § 1(1)(d).
58
Israeli Penal Code, 5737-1977, Art. 316(a)(3).
59
French Public Health Code Art. L2212-1.
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parental selection, including social reasons to abort a pregnancy,
such as lack of ability to offer a happy childhood.
The selective process in England and Israel is subject to
physicians’ discretion, which is not often challenged in court. The
judicial review on the doctors’ assessment of the substantiality of
the risk or of the seriousness of the potential handicap is rarely
successful. Since the law requires the doctors to conclude their
prognosis in ‘good faith’, courts tend to refrain from intervening in
their medical assessment.60 As a result, the reality is that in all three
jurisdictions, a prospective parent is able to opt-out of parentage
based on their will not to parent specific offspring, possibly due to
physical or mental disadvantages. We regard this negative selection
as conditional parentage.
The right of the pregnant woman to choose not to parent her
unborn fetus is also protected under the European Convention of
Human Rights, particularly under Article 8, which protects the right
for private and family life. The European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) is willing to protect the decision to abort a pregnancy as an
inherent part of a woman’s private and family life. However, it has
decided that its regulation is still consistent with section two of the
article,61 allowing states to interfere with this right in the interests of
protecting “morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.” 62 Furthermore, the Court considered a lack of a clear
procedure to review the legitimate criteria for abortion to be in
breach of Article 8 of the Convention, thus creating a positive
obligation on the states to regulate abortions.63
Wrongful birth claims, acknowledged by some legal systems,64
compensate parents for the lost opportunity to abort unwanted
60

In Jepson v The Chief Constable of West Mercia Police Constabulary, [2003]
EWHC (Ch) 3318, a reverend requested a police investigation against the
doctors who approved abortion of a fetus suspected to be born with clef lip and
palate. As police concluded that the doctors’ decision was in good faith the
complaint was reverted. This incident is quite rare and unique, and we were not
able to locate similar cases. For accounts of the developments in this case see
Scott, supra note 2, at 72.
61
Bruggemann and Scheuten v Germany, App. No. 6959/75, 3 Eur. Comm’n
H.R. 244 (1981).
62
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8(2), Nov. 4, 1950.
63
Tysiac v Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. Appl. No. 5410/03 [2007] available at:
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Ty
siac_decision.pdf
64
For a comparative account of such claims in the United States, England and
France see Maria Canellopoulou Bottis, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Actions, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW 55 (2004). In Israel this
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offspring. This imposes liability on physicians to offer parental
selection to parents suspected of having a child with a disability.65
We learn from this that parents are entitled under the law not only
to select whether to parent a fetus or not, but also to receive
information about the physical traits of the prospective child as a
basis for making their decision.
Another aspect of parents’ legitimate practice of conditional
parentage could also be observed in the claim for compensation for
negligent sterilization in certain cases. It is worthy to note that it is
not the mere parentage that is the damage claimed, as the birth of a
healthy child does not usually constitute a tort claim.66 The Queen
Bench in the UK awarded parents compensation for financial
damages only where the child was born with “severe learning
difficulties.”67 We see this as support of our claim that prospective
parents are entitled to place conditions – specifically physical or
medical ones - on their parentage.
So far, in the discussion on abortion, we have detailed mainly
aspects of negative selection where health reasons have justified
conditional parentage. However, conditional parentage, is not
restricted to medical reasons. In several legal systems, social reasons
were also acknowledged by the ECHR as legitimate for aborting a
pregnancy.68 We learn from this that conditional parentage is a legal
phenomenon that is wider than the realm of health and medicine.
However, for the discussion of Eugenics, there is no significance to
reasons of parental selection that are not intended to better the
physical traits of their offspring.
C. PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS (PGD)
Over the last century, the means for becoming a parent has
evolved significantly. Society today benefits from having many
diverse methods of conception. One method is assisted reproduction
doctrine governed for several decades but was neglected in 2012 in the ruling of
C.A. 1326/07 Hammer v. Amit (28.5.12).
65
See for example, the UK case of Rand v East Dorset Health Authority, 56
BMLR 39 [2000], where the court found the health authority responsible for
introducing parents to the choice of abortion.
66
McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [1999] 2 AC 59 (HL) (appeal taken from
Scot.).
67
Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] QB
266.
68
RH v Norway, App. 17004/90 Eur. Commm’n H.R. (1992), available at:
https://www.globalhealthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/H.-v.NORWAY.pdf
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today can be performed by in-vitro fertilization, (IVF). In this
process, a zygote is created by manipulating a sperm cell into an
egg, thus creating an embryo in a laboratory. Due to the risk
involved in harvesting eggs, most procedures require the production
and harvesting of several eggs from a woman. Therefore, it is usual
to produce several embryos in one IVF treatment. The multiple
embryos created in the IVF process allow the performance of PGD.
During the PGD process, once the embryo develops and contains
several cells, one or more of these cells are removed and examined
to detect specific genes. This technique enables the detection of
genetic traits, both desired and undesired, and allows parents to
choose which of the embryos to implant in the woman’s womb.
The process of PGD is helpful for detecting both single gene
defects, such as Cystic Fibrosis, as well as other chromosomal
disorders, such as Down Syndrome. Prospective parents can choose
a single suitable embryo from multiple potential offspring to implant
and birth. As genome mapping develops, it is possible to screen for
any type of genetic traits, not only for defects or chromosomal
disorders. Almost any desired or undesired gene could be diagnosed
and screened, if not today, then in the foreseeable future. 69 This
possibility is, of course, of great controversy.70
In Italy, for example, a rule stating that only three embryos
could be created by IVF and that all must be transferred to a
woman’s uterus, 71 essentially banning PGD, was declared
unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court in 2008 72 and
later by the European Court of Human Rights. 73 In 2012, the right
of a fertile couple to seek medically assisted reproduction was
acknowledged, and Italy was condemned for banning it. The ECHR
judges pointed out the inconsistency in Italian law denying the
couple access to embryo screening while authorizing medicallyassisted termination of pregnancy in cases where the fetus was
suspected of a genetic disease.
69

James Watson, A Personal View of the Project, THE CODE OF THE CODES:
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (Daniel
Kevles & Leroy Hood, eds, 1992).
70
Richard Lewontin, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA (1992).
71
Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita, Legge 19 febbraio
2004, n. 40 (It.).
72
Giuseppe Benagiano & Luca Gianaroli, The Italian Constitutional Court
modifies Italian legislation on assisted reproduction technology, 20 REPROD.
BIOMED. ONLINE 398, 399 (2010). Available at:
https://www.rbmojournal.com/article/S1472-6483(09)00280-6/pdf
73
Costa and Pavan v. Italy, App. No. 54270/2010, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2012.
Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-6452
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To prevent misuse of PGD, some countries regulate it by law.
In England, for example, the Human Fertilization and Embryology
Act of 1990 (HFEA) governs the provision of IVF under a Code of
Practice. Under this code, produced by the Advisory Committee of
Genetic Testing, embryo selection is generally restricted by
regulatory provisions.74 PGD should only be available where there
is a “significant risk of a serious genetic condition… in the
embryo.” 75 The HFEA attempts to detail such risks in several
provisions, which relate to the prospective well-being of the future
child. The conditions of the license provided by the Human
Fertilization and Embryology Authority to perform PGD, under
paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 to this Act, are detailed in Schedule 13
and include risks such as “a serious physical or mental disability” or
“a serious illness.”76
In France, the law allows a specially certified fertility specialist
to perform PGD, but only to select against serious, incurable
diseases. 77 Under another law, an agency (Agence de la
Biomédecine) was created and authorized to oversee assisted
reproductive technology and PGD.78 The Agency sends parents who
wish to perform PGD for assessment at a specialized
interdisciplinary center (Centre Pluridisciplinaire de Diagnostic
Prénatal), that determines whether the conditions are sufficiently
severe and whether the relevant genetic information is sufficiently
prognostic.79
In Israel, where reproduction and fertility play a very central
role in the culture, 80 PGD is practiced intensely, putting Israeli
women among the world’s biggest consumers of prenatal genetic
tests, genetic profiling, and counselling. 81 This practice is
encouraged by generous state funding for PGD and other forms of

74

Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 [hereinafter: HEFA], § 13(9)
and (10) (UK).
75
Advisory Committee of Genetic Testing, Consultation Document on
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, November 1999.
76
HEFA, supra note 74, paragraph 9 Schedule 13.
77
Loi relative à la bioéthique, 2011. Loi no. 2011–814 (France).
78
Loi relative à la bioéthique, 2004. Loi no. 2004–800 (France).
79
REP. AGENCE DE LA BIOMEDECINE, LE DIAGNOSTIC PREIMPLANTATOIRE ET
VOUS (2012), http://www.agencebiomedecine.fr/IMG/pdf/2012_brochure_dpi_vdef.pdf.
80
Sigrid Vertommen, Towards a political economy of egg cell donations: ‘Doing
it the Israeli Way’, CRITICAL KINSHIP STUDIES: KINSHIP (TRANS)FORMED 169,
169 (Charlotte Kroløkke, ed., 2016).
81
Id..
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assisted reproduction.82 Regulation of PGD in Israel is not enforced
by law but by administrative instructions to laboratories 83 and by
scholarly discussions of its bioethical issues. 84 Under these
regulatory regime, PGD is intended to prevent genetically induced
mental and physical disparities, but is both comparatively broad in
the scope of conditions that allow for such intervention, as well as
comparatively loose in the state’s enforcement of the guidelines. In
this regard, Israel stands out as the most liberal in conditional
parentage by means of PGD, out of the jurisdictions examined here.
Both England and France are stricter in their access to PGD.85
In the United States, PGD is not regulated by law, but is
discussed in guidelines and recommendations by professional
societies. The Ethics Committee of the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine published an opinion that considers PGD for
adult-onset conditions “ethically justifiable” when the condition is
serious and there are no known, or only extremely burdensome,
interventions available. This opinion also states that PGD is
“ethically acceptable as a matter of reproductive liberty” for even
less serious or lower penetrance conditions.86 Also, The American
College of Medical Genetics’ recommendations on PGD are to leave
to the parents the decision whether they want to receive and act upon
information about the genetic conditions regarding their future
child.87
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Westreich, supra note 26.
Ministry of Health, Guidelines for Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD),
instructions no. 50/2006 (20.12.2006) (Heb.).
84
There are many scholarly discussions in academic literature, but the most
‘formal’ report was published by the Israel National Science Academy, which
was based on the guidelines Id.. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS COMMITTEE,
“BIOETHICAL ISSUES IN PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS (PGD)
(Michelle Rabal, ed. 2008) (Heb.).
85
Restricted access to assisted reproductive technologies are discussed in SACHA
REBECCA WAXMAN, THE PRE-CONCEPTION WELFARE PRINCIPLE: A CASE
AGAINST REGULATION (A Thesis Submitted to the University of Manchester
School of Law for the Degree of Doctor of Bioethics and Medical
Jurisprudence, 2017).
86
Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Use of
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Serious Adult Onset Conditions: A
Committee Opinion, 100 FERTIL. STERIL. 54 (2013).
87
Wayne W. Grody, Barry H. Thompson, Anthony R. Gregg, Lora H.
Bean, Kristin G. Monaghan, Adele Schneider & Roger V. Lebo, ACMG position
statement on prenatal/preconception expanded carrier screening, 15(5) GEN.
MED. 482 (2013), https://www.nature.com/articles/gim201347.
83
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These provisions relate mainly to negative PGD; that is, the
choice not to implant an embryo with genetic defects.88 Despite ongoing debate regarding the scope of “significant risk” 89 and of
“seriousness of genetic condition,” 90 the choice of prospective
parents to prevent illness from their prospected offspring is largely
accepted both by society and by law. Therefore, negative PGD is a
both a medically and legally legitimate practice of parental
selection.
The most significant challenge to PGD is its positive aspect,
which is choosing to implant an embryo with specific genetic traits.
One practice that was challenged under the PGD license was the
practice of creating a ‘savior sibling’. Since PGD enables the
selection of embryos with specific genetic traits, prospective parents
are medically able to create a sibling for their child of their desired
genetic form. With this practice, a genetic match could be created to
enable organ transplant to the sibling.
The debate over whether the practice of positive PGD is
legitimate under the HFEA arose in the Quintavalle case. 91 The
parents of a boy born with a serious genetic disorder sought IVF
treatment in which any embryo would be tested for its preimplantation genetic status. They requested that only an embryo
capable of producing the stem cells necessary to cure the boy would
be implanted. The HFEA refused to license such a procedure since
it would not constitute treatment of the mother within the Act. It was
held that the Act required only that the procedures undertaken
should be in the course of treating the mother. Such treatment would
include many procedures not directly affecting her. This procedure
would be considered treatment in the context of the treating the
mother, putting it within the scope of the Authority to consider and
therefore license such procedures.
Positive PGD was also acceptable in France in 2013, on a caseby-case basis. Following recommendations from Centre
Pluridisciplinaire de Diagnostic Prénatal, the director of the Agence
de la Biomédecine decided to permit the use of PGD for Human
Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) tissue matching, to select for siblings
88

We wish to note that the provision that allows for sex-selection under this Act,
to prevent gender-related serious medical conditions in the embryo, might also
be regarded as ‘negative’ PGD. This is based on the purpose of the procedure, to
prevent a genetic trait. Id., paragraph 10 Schedule 13.
89
Scott, supra note 2 at 207.
90
Id, at 208.
91
Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, [2005] UKHL
28.
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who can serve as tissue donors.92 Although the decision does not
grant a general license to preform PGD for every ‘sibling savior’
practice, it is indicative of the legitimacy for parents to select their
newborn based on a specific genetic trait.
Another form of positive PGD attracted fierce criticism when
a lesbian couple in the United States deliberately chose to have a
deaf baby.93 The two women, both mental health specialists and deaf
themselves, said they had wanted a child that would be like
themselves, claiming they would make better parents to a deaf child.
The couple was scrutinized publicly, but was autonomous to decide
so legally. In the United States, choosing disability, just as choosing
to prevent one, is not regulated by law and is left to parental
discretion. Furthermore, selecting someone with a disability does
not inevitably mean selecting a child with a lower quality of life.94
This couple’s choice provoked a debate over the morality of their
decision. 95 Nonetheless, whether one sides with or rejects the
parental choice, the fact of the matter is that a choice can and had
been made, making this couple’s parentage conditioned to the
prospective child’s deafness.
To summarize this chapter, we can conclude that conditional
parentage takes place under diverse legal frameworks, such as
adoption, abortion and PGD. We can firmly argue that although
these practices are refrained from being labeled as eugenics, they are
in fact forms of parental selection based on physical and genetic
traits. We can also conclude that these medical-legal phenomena are
well accepted both by law and society.
IV. DELICATE BALANCE – GUIDELINES FOR
REGULATING EUGENICS
Our claim is that eugenics are a fact of life in modern society.
In contrast to the concerns that justified eugenic practices in the past,
parental autonomy is the core justification for eugenics today.
92

Agence de la Biomedecine, Conseil D’Orientation Modification Des Criteres
D’Agrements En Genetique Concernant Le HLA, Deliberation N. 2013-CO-45
(France, Nov. 21, 2013). Available at: http://www.agencebiomedecine.fr/IMG/pdf/deliberation_2013_co_45.pdf
93
David Teather, Lesbian couple have deaf baby by choice, THE GUARDIAN (8
April, 2002). Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/08/davidteather
94
Wilkinson, supra note 32 at 61.
95
Julian Savulescu & Robert Sparrow, Making Better Babies: Pro and Con,
31(1) MONASH BIOETHICS REVIEW 36, (2013).
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Unlike the paternalistic laws of the past that coerced prospective
parents into eugenic practices, such as prevention of intermarriage
or sterilization, the laws of our time are balancing wishes of
prospective parents to use eugenic practices with other important
concerns. Such concerns include community diversity and the
offspring’s quality of life.
Although eugenics can serve justifiable means, eugenics are
prone to abuse and misuse. We acknowledge that both alleviating
all boundaries, on one hand, and coercing parents to parent, on the
other, is undesired. As Agar argues, the use of genetic engineering
should be tailored to the needs of those who wish to improve their
life plans, but would also shield societies from being shaped in the
form dictated by dominant values.96 In this summative section we
offer choices of methods for the regulation of eugenics, based on the
forms of regulation in other conditional parentage practices.
To accomplish the balance of parental autonomy with societal
morality, four forms of regulating conditional parentage are
recognized in this paper. We named these types of potential methods
of regulation: (1) information-based autonomy, (2) intervention only
in positive selection, (3) legal guidelines for parental selection, and
(4) case-by-case review. Outlining these methods of dealing with
eugenic presence in legal and societal lives is far from evaluating
them. In this section, we attempt to highlight the advantages and
challenges of each method, but we refrain from trumping one over
the others.
(1) Information-Based Autonomy
The most lenient method of regulation is the non-regulation of
conditional parentage. Under this regime, states simply leave free
choice to the parents. For this method to be morally legitimate,
parental choice should be based on full and valid information. We
identify this practice in the United States regarding PGD, where
professional associations offer education and recommendations, but
the law does not interfere with the parental choice.
Being a parent is hard enough…yet, many people parent
because they choose to, not because they are coerced into it.
However, not all parents think through the potential hardships of
parenting when choosing to procreate. For those who do, the
information-based autonomy model suggests that it is legitimate, as
96

Agar, supra note 6.
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in any voluntary decision, to opt for hardship and to persevere. It is
also just as legitimate to opt-out of hardship and to aim at avoiding
it. Both decisions fall within the realm of personal autonomy.97
This type of method bases conditional parentage on theories of
informed consent. The expression “informed consent” relates to the
legal obligation of a doctor to provide a patient with the information
relevant to the decision-making and to receive consent prior to any
medical procedure being carried out. Informed consent is mandatory
prior to obtaining medical treatment. However, when regulating
conditional parentage, it is not mandatory but voluntary. The parents
have a right to be provided with information98 and a right to choose
their course of action accordingly, but their actions are not
conditioned on their consent to this information. The obligatory
nature of the information lies on the state to provide it, not on the
parents to accept it.
The question is how much information and what type of
information should be given to the parents to enable them to be truly
informed. Neither legislature, court rulings, nor literature has yet
provided a definitive answer. 99 Courts tend to decide based on a
standard of “reasonability” when discussing the breadth and depth
of the information given by a physician to a patient.100 These rulings
are intended to deal only with the health of the patient, and do not
deal with the implications on the prospective offspring or society.
We argue that under this method of regulating conditional
parentage, it is the state’s duty to inform parents of all aspects of
their decision. We fear that without a legal requirement to provide
the parents with information regarding a wide set of considerations,
it is unclear whether this method of regulating conditional parentage
97

This ethical view was expressed in Savulescu’s remarks in Savulescu &
Sparrow, supra note 95, at 43.
98
The French Public Health Code clearly states this in regard to abortion in Art.
L2212-1. This is also the case in Israeli regulation for PDG, supra note 83.
However, even under such requirement, any information given to parents is of
course pending funding and availability.
99
Margaret A. Somerville, Labels Versus contents: Variance Between
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Law in the Concepts Governing Decision Making,
39 MCGILL L.J. 179 (1994); EDWARDS RICHARDS & KATHARINE RATHBUN,
LAW AND THE PHYSICIANS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 145 (1993); GEORGE POZGAR,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 301 (1993).
100
See for example Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309
(1994); see also Canada’s High Court of Justice in Arndt. v. Smith, 126 D.L.R
(4th) 705 (1995); Arndt v. Smith, 148, D.L.R (4th) 48 (1997); see also Australia’s
High Court in Rogers v. Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Austl.); see also
ECHR 2013/14 Csoma v. Romania, 15 January 2013, no. 8759/05 (Third
Section).
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can lay within the framework of the doctrine of informed consent.
Research suggests that manipulation of information may give
prospective parents the sense that they are making a free choice,
while they are actually “nudged” into a choice that is preferable for
certain stakeholders.101 This approach does not coerce the parents’
decision, thus respecting their autonomy, but rather puts a burden on
the state to provide valid information on all aspects of the decision.
Do we trust parents to make a decision that would balance both
their needs and societal concerns? 102 Should parental skills or
abilities determine the approval or refusal to allow parental
selection? Should a less capable parent be given more freedom to
choose their prospective offspring? Although not all people are fit
to parent, the literature on parenting admits that it is not possible to
establish what makes a “good” parent. 103 With no agreed or
research-based good-parenting guidelines, such limitation on
parental autonomy seems arbitrary, offensive and inefficient. It
does, however, infuse doubt into the information-based autonomy
regulatory method.
(2) Intervention in ‘Positive’ Selection
The next form of regulation of parental choice is found in most
adoption laws. This type of regulation differentiates between
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ selection. Despite the fact that there is no
judicial intervention in negative adoption (the prospective parents’
choice not to adopt a certain child), there is, however, much
intervention in ‘positive’ adoption (i.e. courts protect or deny
prospective parents’ choice to adopt a specific child). Under this
regime, the state is prohibited from intervening in peoples’ decision
not to parent an offspring with specific traits while allowing the state
to intervene in the positive choice to parent-specific offspring. In
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several legal systems, the right not to parent overrides the right to
parent,104 and it is legitimate to allow parents to opt-out of parenting.
Regulating positive conditional parentage by state intervention
is contrary to the principle of ‘Procreative Beneficence’.105 Under
this principle, parents do not only have reason to want the best for
their children, but they are also morally obligated to attempt to
produce the best child possible. Restricting this obligation is also
questionable in light of liberal views that do not see a moral
difference between enhancing capabilities by intervention with
environment (such as diet or education) and enhancing capabilities
by genetic engineering.106 If states refrain from restricting parents
from enhancing their children’s capabilities by adding extra tutoring
to their education or adding vitamins to their diets, then why should
states limit parents who are able to afford to design genetically
enhanced babies?
There are two justifications for state intervention in such
parental choice. The first justification would be that nonintervention would cause injustice by unequal distribution of
eugenic goods. States have an obligation to distribute resources
equally, but it is possible to justify distribution of eugenic goods by
state regulation by means of Rawlsian justice. Rawls’s Difference
Principle justifies deviation from equal distribution of goods, such
as liberty and opportunity, only if the unequal distribution betters
society as a whole, especially the least privileged in society. 107
Therefore, a regulation model that intervenes in ‘positive’
conditional parentage to ensure that all prospective parents have
access to positive selection, is considered legitimate. This can be
achieved with generous state funding of such processes, as is the
case in Israel.108
The second reason for states’ regulation of positive selection
relies on two of the many critiques of the Procreative Beneficence
Principle. 109 The first is concerned with the possible abuse of
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scientific developments in parental screening, which in time will
most likely enable more and more possibilities for selection, perhaps
to the point of ordering an exact model of a child.110 King fears that
parents’ preference for certain types of children is “not too far
removed from their experience as consumers, choosing amongst
different products.” 111 Genetic diagnostics and fetal selection are
terms generally ascribed to sinister regimes, that turn the child into
a ‘commodity’, so such concerns are understandable.”112 It should
be argued, though, that the commodification argument fails to
ignore a distinction between the commercial value to parental
selection and the actual treatment of children as commodities. 113
Thus, fear of commodification simply justifies regulation.
The second critique is the fear of diversity. Biologically
speaking, diversity is a strength, and genetic mutations have an
evolutionary role. 114 It is Agar who expressed concern about
diversity by allowing parents to choose genetic traits. 115 From a
liberal perspective, restricting parental choice, based on what states
consider desirable, is immoral because it too might eliminate
diverse life plans that are inherent to the liberal ideology.116 Having
said that, states do intervene in the market of human improvements
by allocating education and health funds. Shouldn’t the same
standards be applied to both types of intervention?117
With these perils in mind, we should also remember that there
are tangible benefits to positive parental selection. Positive parental
selection is not only about the moral right of autonomy nor the wellbeing of the family, it is also about creating future generations with
fewer illnesses and better prospects for success. Conditioning
110

See generally Wolfram Henn, Consumerism in Prenatal Diagnosis: A
Challenge for Ethical Guideline”, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 444 (2000). (noting that
some reject this possibility and argue that testing for certain traits, such as
intelligence or aspects of personality, demands testing a higher number of
embryos than what is usually created in IVF, that it is unlikely to be done); see
also Edwin Kirk, Embryo Selection for Complex Traits is Impracticable, 326
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 53 (203).
111
King, supra note 29, at 180.
112
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEM IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: THE
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS
(1982).
113
Wilkinson, supra note 32 at 132.
114
King, supra note 29, at 181.
115
Agar, supra note 6, at 144.
116
See Vertommen, supra note 80, for an explanation that such accusations are
already made against the ‘market’ of egg cells in Israel.
117
Id. at 143.

46

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:19

parentage on successful, healthy offspring is not all bad, despite the
questionable reputation of this practice.
(3) Legal Guidelines for Parental Selection
The third form of regulation is providing a legal framework that
outlines the conditions for parental choice. We see this type of
regulation in HFEA, 118 for example. Under this regime of
regulation, conditioning parentage – both positive and negative— is
subject to a set of legal guidelines, dictated by the legislature. The
legislation is an expression of the common values of society.
The argument against this method would be the loss of parental
autonomy and state intervention in private affairs. Some argue that
pure autonomy does not exist in modern societies, since we
willingly relinquish our freedoms for societal order, 119 thus any
legislative regulation could be considered “apparent paternalistic
intervention,” since it is an intervention by the legislator that
expresses the desires of people whose freedom is restricted, and
these desires can be realized only within the legal limits. 120 If
parents agree to relinquish their autonomy in areas where they want
legislative regulation, then this is not paternalism and hence, not
considered a loss of autonomy.
Another argument reiterates the one expressed above,
regarding the dominance of national values over private ones.
Modern liberal societies fear the perils of a regime that dictates
values to individuals, especially in intimate areas of life, such as
family and procreation, where enforcement is almost impossible.
Such regulation is deemed obsolete and dangerous. Although values
change throughout the eras and locations, some values gain traction
in many societies and are expressed in their legal systems. We see
this, for example, in the “welfare principle.” Under this principle,
the child’s best interests is the paramount consideration in any
decision concerning them.121 The European Convention of Human
Right acknowledged state interference in family life could be
considered a breach of human rights if not justified by the values in
118
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consensus. 122 The exception in Article 8 of the convention
acknowledges conditions that justify legal intervention in family
life, where societal well-being is at risk.
Further support for the legislature-based model can be based on
some of the critiques to the information-based model. There are
prominent voices in the bioethics community arguing for “the right
to remain in ignorance.” 123 While testing for genetic disorders
contributes to the family’s knowledge of the genetic make-up of
their prospective child, it does not prevent harm to future children.
Such practices serve only the interests of the parents but not that of
their future child. Therefore, it is ethically wrong to base a decision
regarding future children on the same standards for informed
consent as any other medical treatment. Under a legislative regime,
allocating eugenic goods it is not left solely to the parents’
autonomy, but rather the future children’s interests are to be
regarded as well.
It is also possible to justify the state distribution of eugenic
goods through state regulation by means of Rawlsian justice. As
mentioned, Rawls’s Difference Principle justifies deviation from the
equal distribution of goods, such as liberty and opportunity only if
the unequal distribution better society as a whole, especially the
ones with lesser influence in society.124 Rawls’ approach serves the
argument for negative selection (such as enhancing resistance to the
flu) because it serves more lives than positive selection (such as
height or musical talent). Some traits, such as the enhancement of
intelligence, are not as easily categorized.125 Should it be considered
beneficial to the individual, thus, unjustified by Rawls, or can it help
society as a whole, thus, justified?
To summarize the model of legislative regulation, we can argue
on one hand, for a clear and balanced expression of common societal
values. On the other hand, concerns for the overriding of national
values over personal values are also to be reckoned with. This
122
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delicate balance in modern legal systems is scrutinized and
examined by the judiciary, to ensure legitimate use of legislative
powers and sufficient attentiveness to parental choice.
(4) Case-by-Case Review
The last form of possible regulation of conditional parentage
could be the case-by-case review by a multidisciplinary board of
experts. Such a regulatory method is applied in France for
determining the legitimacy of positive PDG in the case of “sibling
savior” parentage. Regulating parentage on a case-by-case method
has the advantage of applying specific consideration to the specific
family’s needs. The board’s deliberation process can contribute to
the family’s sense of justice and therefore, respects their right to due
process. The use of professionals, not merely state administrators,
minimizes the risk of dogmatic dictation of societal values and shifts
the focus on medical and ethical concerns, rather than national
concerns.
As in every regulatory procedure that is not unified and
standard, legal certainty and expectations are compromised. It is
nearly impossible to conduct a regulatory system where most
decisions are governed on a case-by-case basis, for two possible
reasons. One reason is that it puts enormous strain on public
resources. As technology advances, selective parentage becomes
more easily accessible by potential parents. If the professional board
becomes the only obstacle for the family, it would quickly be
overburdened with requests for review, creating a need to decide
faster, either by shorter deliberation or with added personnel. This
solution is neither good for prospective parents nor for society.
Shorter deliberations risk the merits of the process, while added
board members add resources and risks contradicting results for
similar cases.
The second reason that a case-by-case review process is not a
useful regulatory process is that in large numbers, such process
eventually becomes policy-making. It is inevitable that
technological advancement and societal values will allow for more
and more opportunities regarding parental selection. Thus, if the
whole point of a case-by-case review process is to attend to the
needs of specific families, it is inevitable that families’ concerns
would be categorized and regarded considering previous decisions
of the board. This is not only due to efficiency concerns and the need
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to process many requests in a timely manner, but also due to the
sense of equal treatment that public servants are obliged to.
Despite the regulatory deficiency of such method, it has an
advantage that legal regulation misses. The tendency to respect and
to obey professional authority in private matters, such as doctors and
other professionals, is commonly greater than legal obedience.126 A
professional advisory board, even if it applies policy based on
ethical and societal values, is likely to be trusted publicly more than
legislative policy dictating family values. Another advantage of
professional advisory board is the updated information that may be
applied to the decision. Whereas legislature is stagnant in nature, in
a realm of rapid advancements, many legislative regulations become
dated and even obsolete, in light of technological advancements. A
board of professionals is able not only to be more flexible than a
legislator but also to apply state-of-the-art knowledge in the
deliberations.
V. SUMMARY
Becoming a parent is a life-changing event. It is only natural
that people put extreme emphasis on decisions regarding their
parentage. It is also commonly accepted that parentage is not a
necessity, but a privilege for those who want it. Therefore, we view
it acceptable to place conditions over this pivotal experience. Not
everyone is obliged to be a parent and parenting is not mandatory
under any circumstances. Indeed, both law and society allow
individuals to condition the decision to parent.
It is, however, questionable what conditions are placed on
parentage. All prospective parents wish for a healthy offspring with
maximum potential to succeed in life. But are all preferences
legitimate? When past regimes took advantage of scientific
advancements to control breeding, this led to horrific acts. Eugenics
became a foul concept. The justified aim of the eugenic movement–
to better human life and minimize pain suffering-took a sickening
turn into complete erasure of personal autonomy.
With careful avoidance of using the term eugenics, the idea of
parental selection and controlled breeding advanced rapidly. This
advancement was not only scientific, but also legal and societal. In
this paper, we demonstrated legally and socially acceptable methods
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for parental selection: in adoption processes, in abortion regulation,
and in PGD procedures. Eugenics, the improvement of breeding, is
a modern fact of life. Conditioning parentage on the existence of
specific traits of the prospective child (positive eugenics) and
conditioning parentage on the absence of a specific trait of the
prospective child (negative eugenics) is recognized by legal systems
and by public values.
We are fully aware of the perils of this phenomenon. It is
impossible to forget the detrimental results of past interventions in
parentage decisions. Alas, the use of eugenic rhetoric in the past was
a means by regimes to restrict personal autonomy and apply
paternalistic values. Conditional parentage in current times is the
exact opposite. It is a means for individuals to exercise private rights
and make autonomous decisions about their parentage. States’
paternalistic interventions in these conditions, where there are such
interventions, are made to restrict individuals from applying eugenic
practices in the private realm; they are intended to restrict parental
choice rather than coerce one.
The difference between past paternalistic intervention in
parental selection and current paternalistic restrictions does not
make such regulation redundant. We acknowledge the need for
oversight in the conditions–positive or negative–that individuals
place on parentage. Although such conditions may contribute to the
well-being of the family and society at large, they may also harm it.
These conditions may quickly slip into a dystopian reality of tailormade, homogenic, commodified society, with all respective horrors
of the past.
We urge in this paper, to not only acknowledge and accept
eugenic as a current reality of parentage, but we also argue for its
regulation. In this paper we highlighted four methods of regulation
that we recognize in parental selection practices. We evaluate the
benefits and challenges of each method but dare not rate them.
Instead, we call for an open discussion, without the pretense that
eugenics are banned or outcasted, on the regulatory processes that
are required to protect society and its individuals from abuse of
scientific advancements.

